Commit 9e9aae5eab for openssl.org
commit 9e9aae5eabec596d82b8ae7dbb1d9997e5c406a0
Author: Daniel Kubec <kubec@openssl.foundation>
Date: Thu Nov 19 03:09:18 2026 +0000
EVP: EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params() with a key initialises the MAC context
Commit 2f2950e ("EVP: Enforce the whole MAC life-cycle at the EVP
layer") makes EVP_MAC_update() and EVP_MAC_final() fail
with EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED on any context that was
not initialised via EVP_MAC_init() / EVP_MAC_init_SKEY().
Since the MAC life-cycle is enforced at the EVP layer, a context keyed
only through EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params() was rejected by EVP_MAC_update()
and EVP_MAC_final(). That broke the documented way of setting up
the HMAC in a SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_key_evp_cb() callback.
When the parameters contain OSSL_MAC_PARAM_KEY, the call is now
equivalent to EVP_MAC_init() with a NULL key and the same parameters.
It goes through the implementation's init function rather than only
updating the state, because KMAC and BLAKE2 merely store a key given
as a parameter and set up their working state in init.
Resolves: https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/33790
Fixes: 2f2950ef2cc8 "EVP: Enforce the whole MAC life-cycle at the EVP layer"
References: a76ce2862bc6 "TLS: use EVP for HMAC throughout libssl."
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-fable-5-2
Co-authored-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Jakub Zelenka <jakub.zelenka@openssl.foundation>
Reviewed-by: Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@openssl.org>
Merge-date: Sun Nov 22 04:03:02 2026
Merged-from: https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/33804
diff --git a/CHANGES.md b/CHANGES.md
index c4309cdb36..3484cd1a5b 100644
--- a/CHANGES.md
+++ b/CHANGES.md
@@ -104,10 +104,12 @@ OpenSSL 4.2
life_cycle-mac(7). `EVP_MAC_update()`, `EVP_MAC_final()` and
`EVP_MAC_finalXOF()` fail with an error when called on an `EVP_MAC_CTX`
that has not been initialised with `EVP_MAC_init()` or
- `EVP_MAC_init_SKEY()`, including one whose key was only supplied through
- `EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params()`, or that has already been finalised and not
- been re-initialised since. A failed `EVP_MAC_init()` or
- `EVP_MAC_init_SKEY()` leaves the context uninitialised.
+ `EVP_MAC_init_SKEY()`, or that has already been finalised and not been
+ re-initialised since. A failed `EVP_MAC_init()` or `EVP_MAC_init_SKEY()`
+ leaves the context uninitialised. Supplying the key through
+ `EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params()` initialises the context too: with the
+ `OSSL_MAC_PARAM_KEY` parameter it is equivalent to `EVP_MAC_init()` with
+ a NULL key and the same parameters, for every MAC implementation.
<!-- https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/33084-->
*Daniel Kubec*
diff --git a/crypto/evp/evp_local.h b/crypto/evp/evp_local.h
index 346bcacec2..cd8c0f9c5c 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/evp_local.h
+++ b/crypto/evp/evp_local.h
@@ -80,8 +80,10 @@ struct evp_mac_ctx_st {
* at EVP_MAC_STATE_NEW (zero), a successful EVP_MAC_init() or
* EVP_MAC_init_SKEY() moves to INITIALISED, a failed one back to NEW,
* EVP_MAC_update() to UPDATED and EVP_MAC_final()/EVP_MAC_finalXOF() to
- * FINALISED. EVP_MAC_update(), EVP_MAC_final() and EVP_MAC_finalXOF()
- * are rejected in the NEW and FINALISED states.
+ * FINALISED. EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params() counts as EVP_MAC_init() when it
+ * is given a key. EVP_MAC_update(),
+ * EVP_MAC_final() and EVP_MAC_finalXOF() are rejected in the NEW and
+ * FINALISED states.
*/
enum {
EVP_MAC_STATE_NEW = 0,
diff --git a/crypto/evp/mac_lib.c b/crypto/evp/mac_lib.c
index 1b19538e3b..ee2b7a034f 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/mac_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/mac_lib.c
@@ -251,6 +251,17 @@ int EVP_MAC_CTX_get_params(EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
int EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
{
+ /*
+ * Supplying a key starts the MAC operation, as documented for the "key"
+ * parameter: it is the same as EVP_MAC_init() with a NULL key and these
+ * parameters. Going through the implementation's init function, rather
+ * than just recording the new state here, matters for the implementations
+ * that only store a key given as a parameter and set up their working
+ * state from it in init (KMAC, BLAKE2).
+ */
+ if (ctx->meth->init != NULL
+ && OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_MAC_PARAM_KEY) != NULL)
+ return EVP_MAC_init(ctx, NULL, 0, params);
if (ctx->meth->set_ctx_params != NULL)
return ctx->meth->set_ctx_params(ctx->algctx, params);
return 1;
diff --git a/doc/life-cycles/mac.dot b/doc/life-cycles/mac.dot
index fe277f8328..bc10d5195e 100644
--- a/doc/life-cycles/mac.dot
+++ b/doc/life-cycles/mac.dot
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ digraph mac {
end [label=freed, color="#deeaee", style="filled"];
begin -> newed [label="EVP_MAC_CTX_new"];
- newed -> initialised [label="EVP_MAC_init"];
+ newed -> initialised [label="EVP_MAC_init\nEVP_MAC_CTX_set_params (key)"];
initialised -> updated [label="EVP_MAC_update"];
updated -> updated [label="EVP_MAC_update"];
updated -> finaled [label="EVP_MAC_final"];
@@ -20,9 +20,9 @@ digraph mac {
fontcolor="#808080", color="#808080"];
*/
finaled -> end [label="EVP_MAC_CTX_free"];
- updated -> initialised [label="EVP_MAC_init", style=dashed,
- color="#034f84", fontcolor="#034f84"];
- finaled -> initialised [label="EVP_MAC_init", style=dashed,
- color="#034f84", fontcolor="#034f84"];
+ updated -> initialised [label="EVP_MAC_init\nEVP_MAC_CTX_set_params (key)",
+ style=dashed, color="#034f84", fontcolor="#034f84"];
+ finaled -> initialised [label="EVP_MAC_init\nEVP_MAC_CTX_set_params (key)",
+ style=dashed, color="#034f84", fontcolor="#034f84"];
}
diff --git a/doc/man3/EVP_MAC.pod b/doc/man3/EVP_MAC.pod
index 2a2ffb33b8..e428b569e3 100644
--- a/doc/man3/EVP_MAC.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/EVP_MAC.pod
@@ -150,7 +150,8 @@ Note: There are additional requirements for some MAC algorithms during
re-initialization (i.e. calling EVP_MAC_init() on an EVP_MAC after EVP_MAC_final()
has been called on the same object). See the NOTES section below.
-EVP_MAC_init() must be called before EVP_MAC_update() and EVP_MAC_final().
+EVP_MAC_init() must be called before EVP_MAC_update() and EVP_MAC_final(),
+unless the key is supplied with EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(), see below.
EVP_MAC_init_SKEY() is similar to EVP_MAC_init() but it accepts an opaque
B<EVP_SKEY> object as a key.
@@ -171,15 +172,15 @@ EVP_MAC_finalXOF() does the final computation for an XOF based MAC and stores
the result in the memory pointed at by I<out> of size I<outsize>.
EVP_MAC_update(), EVP_MAC_final() and EVP_MAC_finalXOF() require I<ctx> to
-have been initialised with EVP_MAC_init() or EVP_MAC_init_SKEY() and fail
-otherwise. Once EVP_MAC_final() or EVP_MAC_finalXOF() has been called,
-I<ctx> is finalised and these three functions fail again until it is
-re-initialised. A failed EVP_MAC_init() or EVP_MAC_init_SKEY() leaves
-I<ctx> uninitialised, whatever its state was before, as the implementation
-may have been partially re-initialised. Calling EVP_MAC_final() with
-I<out> set to NULL to query the output length is possible in any state, and
-a copy made with EVP_MAC_CTX_dup() is in the same state as the original.
-Supplying a key with EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params() does not initialise I<ctx>.
+have been initialised with EVP_MAC_init() or EVP_MAC_init_SKEY(), or by
+supplying a key with EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(), and fail otherwise. Once
+EVP_MAC_final() or EVP_MAC_finalXOF() has been called, I<ctx> is finalised
+and these three functions fail again until it is re-initialised. A failed
+EVP_MAC_init() or EVP_MAC_init_SKEY() leaves I<ctx> uninitialised, whatever
+its state was before, as the implementation may have been partially
+re-initialised. Calling EVP_MAC_final() with I<out> set to NULL to query the
+output length is possible in any state, and a copy made with
+EVP_MAC_CTX_dup() is in the same state as the original.
EVP_MAC_get_params() retrieves details about the implementation
I<mac>.
@@ -204,6 +205,11 @@ Note that a parameter that is unknown in the underlying context is
simply ignored.
Also, what happens when a needed parameter isn't passed down is
defined by the implementation.
+If I<params> contain the B<OSSL_MAC_PARAM_KEY> ("key") parameter, the call
+is equivalent to calling EVP_MAC_init() with a NULL I<key> and those
+I<params>: I<ctx> is initialised, or re-initialised with any input supplied
+so far being discarded, and a failure leaves I<ctx> uninitialised.
+Parameters without a key never change whether I<ctx> is initialised.
EVP_MAC_gettable_params() returns an L<OSSL_PARAM(3)> array that describes
the retrievable and settable parameters. EVP_MAC_gettable_params()
@@ -268,9 +274,12 @@ The standard parameter names are:
=item "key" (B<OSSL_MAC_PARAM_KEY>) <octet string>
Its value is the MAC key as an array of bytes.
+Setting it with EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params() initialises the context, in the
+same way as passing the key to EVP_MAC_init() does.
For MACs that use an underlying computation algorithm, the algorithm
-must be set first, see "cipher" and "digest" parameters below.
+must be set first, or along with the key, see "cipher" and "digest"
+parameters below.
=item "iv" (B<OSSL_MAC_PARAM_IV>) <octet string>
@@ -510,6 +519,9 @@ The EVP_MAC_init_SKEY() function was added in OpenSSL 3.5.
Since OpenSSL 4.2, EVP_MAC_update(), EVP_MAC_final() and EVP_MAC_finalXOF()
fail on a context that has not been initialised, or that has been finalised
and not re-initialised since. Previously results of such calls were undefined.
+Whether a key supplied with EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params() left the context usable
+without a call to EVP_MAC_init() was up to the implementation before
+OpenSSL 4.2; it now always initialises the context.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
diff --git a/doc/man7/img/mac.png b/doc/man7/img/mac.png
index d3978767c9..56bcf8b7c3 100644
Binary files a/doc/man7/img/mac.png and b/doc/man7/img/mac.png differ
diff --git a/doc/man7/life_cycle-mac.pod b/doc/man7/life_cycle-mac.pod
index 6cdf7519ce..6b77054340 100644
--- a/doc/man7/life_cycle-mac.pod
+++ b/doc/man7/life_cycle-mac.pod
@@ -49,39 +49,40 @@ The usual life-cycle of a MAC is illustrated:
=begin man
- +-------------------+
- | start |
- +-------------------+
- |
- | EVP_MAC_CTX_new
- v
- +-------------------+
- | newed |
- +-------------------+
- |
- | EVP_MAC_init
- v
- +-------------------+
- +> | initialised | <+
- | +-------------------+ |
- | | |
- | | EVP_MAC_update | EVP_MAC_init
- | v |
- EVP_MAC_init | +-------------------+ |
- | | updated | -+
- | +-------------------+
- | | |
- | | EVP_MAC_final | EVP_MAC_finalXOF
- | v v
- | +-------------------+
- +- | finaled |
- +-------------------+
- |
- | EVP_MAC_CTX_free
- v
- +-------------------+
- | freed |
- +-------------------+
+ +-------------------+
+ | start |
+ +-------------------+
+ |
+ | EVP_MAC_CTX_new
+ v
+ +-------------------+
+ | newed |
+ +-------------------+
+ |
+ | EVP_MAC_init
+ | EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params (key)
+ v
+ +-------------------+
+ +> | initialised | <+
+ | +-------------------+ |
+ | | |
+ | | EVP_MAC_update | EVP_MAC_init
+ | v | EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params (key)
+ EVP_MAC_init | +-------------------+ |
+ EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params (key) | | updated | -+
+ | +-------------------+
+ | | |
+ | | EVP_MAC_final | EVP_MAC_finalXOF
+ | v v
+ | +-------------------+
+ +- | finaled |
+ +-------------------+
+ |
+ | EVP_MAC_CTX_free
+ v
+ +-------------------+
+ | freed |
+ +-------------------+
=end man
@@ -106,6 +107,7 @@ This is the canonical list.
EVP_MAC_CTX_free freed freed freed freed freed
EVP_MAC_CTX_get_params newed initialised updated finaled
EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params newed initialised updated finaled
+ EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params (key) initialised initialised initialised initialised
EVP_MAC_CTX_gettable_params newed initialised updated finaled
EVP_MAC_CTX_settable_params newed initialised updated finaled
@@ -193,6 +195,13 @@ This is the canonical list.
<td style="border:1px solid" align="center">updated</td>
<td style="border:1px solid" align="center">finaled</td>
<td style="border:1px solid" align="center"></td></tr>
+<tr><th style="border:1px solid" align="left">EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params (key)</th>
+ <td style="border:1px solid" align="center"></td>
+ <td style="border:1px solid" align="center">initialised</td>
+ <td style="border:1px solid" align="center">initialised</td>
+ <td style="border:1px solid" align="center">initialised</td>
+ <td style="border:1px solid" align="center">initialised</td>
+ <td style="border:1px solid" align="center"></td></tr>
<tr><th style="border:1px solid" align="left">EVP_MAC_CTX_gettable_params</th>
<td style="border:1px solid" align="center"></td>
<td style="border:1px solid" align="center">newed</td>
@@ -219,6 +228,11 @@ B<newed> and B<finaled> states, see L<EVP_MAC(3)>. Querying the output
length by calling EVP_MAC_final() with a NULL output buffer is permitted in
every state and does not change it.
+EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params() does not change the state, except when it is given
+the MAC key (B<OSSL_MAC_PARAM_KEY>). It is then equivalent to EVP_MAC_init()
+with a NULL key and the same parameters, which is the "(key)" row of the
+table above.
+
=head1 SEE ALSO
L<provider-mac(7)>, L<EVP_MAC(3)>.
diff --git a/test/evp_extra_test.c b/test/evp_extra_test.c
index 822be5fc4c..d5dfcdb45a 100644
--- a/test/evp_extra_test.c
+++ b/test/evp_extra_test.c
@@ -2401,8 +2401,9 @@ static int test_evp_mac_life_cycle(int idx)
const MAC_LIFE_CYCLE_TEST *t = &mac_life_cycle_tests[idx];
int ret = 0;
EVP_MAC *mac = NULL;
- EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx = NULL, *dup = NULL, *pre = NULL;
+ EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx = NULL, *dup = NULL, *pre = NULL, *kctx = NULL;
OSSL_PARAM init_params[3], reinit_params[2], bad_params[2], *p;
+ OSSL_PARAM key_params[4], bad_key_params[3];
static const unsigned char data[] = "EVP_MAC life-cycle enforcement";
unsigned char key[32], iv[12];
unsigned char mac1[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], mac2[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
@@ -2432,6 +2433,25 @@ static int test_evp_mac_life_cycle(int idx)
(char *)"no-such-algorithm", 0);
bad_params[1] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
}
+ /* The parameters of init_params together with the key */
+ p = key_params;
+ if (t->subalg != NULL)
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(t->subalg_param,
+ (char *)t->subalg, 0);
+ if (t->needs_iv)
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_IV,
+ iv, sizeof(iv));
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_KEY,
+ key, t->keylen);
+ *p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
+ /* A key that cannot be set: unknown sub-algorithm or bad key length */
+ p = bad_key_params;
+ if (t->subalg_param != NULL)
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(t->subalg_param,
+ (char *)"no-such-algorithm", 0);
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_KEY, key,
+ t->subalg_param != NULL ? t->keylen : t->bad_keylen);
+ *p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
ERR_clear_error();
if (!TEST_ptr(mac = EVP_MAC_fetch(testctx, t->name, testpropq))
@@ -2606,8 +2626,66 @@ static int test_evp_mac_life_cycle(int idx)
|| !TEST_ulong_eq(ERR_peek_error(), 0))
goto err;
+ /*
+ * EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params() does not initialise a new context unless it
+ * is given a key, in which case it is the same as EVP_MAC_init().
+ */
+ if (!TEST_ptr(kctx = EVP_MAC_CTX_new(mac))
+ || !TEST_true(EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(kctx, init_params))
+ || !TEST_false(EVP_MAC_update(kctx, data, sizeof(data)))
+ || !TEST_err_r(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED))
+ goto err;
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ if (!TEST_true(EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(kctx, key_params))
+ || !TEST_true(EVP_MAC_update(kctx, data, sizeof(data)))
+ || !TEST_true(EVP_MAC_final(kctx, mac2, &mac2len, sizeof(mac2)))
+ || !TEST_mem_eq(mac2, mac2len, mac1, mac1len)
+ || !TEST_ulong_eq(ERR_peek_error(), 0))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* It re-initialises a finalised context, and discards pending input */
+ if (!TEST_true(EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(kctx, key_params))
+ || !TEST_true(EVP_MAC_update(kctx, iv, sizeof(iv)))
+ || !TEST_true(EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(kctx, key_params))
+ || !TEST_true(EVP_MAC_update(kctx, data, sizeof(data)))
+ || !TEST_true(EVP_MAC_final(kctx, mac2, &mac2len, sizeof(mac2)))
+ || !TEST_mem_eq(mac2, mac2len, mac1, mac1len))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* Output can be produced straight after it (empty input) */
+ if (!TEST_true(EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(kctx, key_params))
+ || !TEST_true(EVP_MAC_final(kctx, mac2, &mac2len, sizeof(mac2)))
+ || !TEST_size_t_gt(mac2len, 0)
+ || !TEST_ulong_eq(ERR_peek_error(), 0))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* Like a failed EVP_MAC_init(), a key that is rejected resets the state */
+ if (!TEST_true(EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(kctx, key_params))
+ || !TEST_true(EVP_MAC_update(kctx, data, sizeof(data)))
+ || !TEST_false(EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(kctx, bad_key_params)))
+ goto err;
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ if (!TEST_false(EVP_MAC_update(kctx, data, sizeof(data)))
+ || !TEST_err_r(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED)
+ || !TEST_false(EVP_MAC_final(kctx, mac2, &mac2len, sizeof(mac2)))
+ || !TEST_err_r(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED))
+ goto err;
+ ERR_clear_error();
+
+ /* Parameters without a key still leave the state alone afterwards */
+ if (!TEST_true(EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(kctx, key_params))
+ || !TEST_true(EVP_MAC_update(kctx, data, sizeof(data)))
+ || !TEST_true(EVP_MAC_final(kctx, mac2, &mac2len, sizeof(mac2)))
+ || !TEST_mem_eq(mac2, mac2len, mac1, mac1len)
+ || !TEST_true(EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(kctx, reinit_params))
+ || !TEST_false(EVP_MAC_update(kctx, data, sizeof(data)))
+ || !TEST_err_r(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_UPDATE_ERROR))
+ goto err;
+ ERR_clear_error();
+
ret = 1;
err:
+ EVP_MAC_CTX_free(kctx);
EVP_MAC_CTX_free(pre);
EVP_MAC_CTX_free(dup);
EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx);
diff --git a/test/sslapitest.c b/test/sslapitest.c
index cec221ac44..40fd1123ae 100644
--- a/test/sslapitest.c
+++ b/test/sslapitest.c
@@ -12501,6 +12501,8 @@ static int test_ssl_get_shared_ciphers(int tst)
static const char *appdata = "Hello World";
static int gen_tick_called, dec_tick_called, tick_key_cb_called;
static int tick_key_renew = 0;
+/* Key the ticket HMAC with EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params() only, as documented */
+static int tick_key_set_params = 0;
static SSL_TICKET_RETURN tick_dec_ret = SSL_TICKET_RETURN_ABORT;
static int gen_tick_cb(SSL *s, void *arg)
@@ -12603,7 +12605,7 @@ static int tick_key_evp_cb(SSL *s, unsigned char key_name[16],
{
const unsigned char tick_aes_key[16] = { '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', 'a', 'b', 'c', 'd', 'e', 'f' };
unsigned char tick_hmac_key[16] = { '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', '8', '9', 'a', 'b', 'c', 'd', 'e', 'f' };
- OSSL_PARAM params[2];
+ OSSL_PARAM params[3], *p = params;
EVP_CIPHER *aes128cbc;
int ret;
@@ -12618,13 +12620,18 @@ static int tick_key_evp_cb(SSL *s, unsigned char key_name[16],
memset(iv, 0, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
memset(key_name, 0, 16);
- params[0] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_DIGEST,
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_DIGEST,
"SHA256", 0);
- params[1] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
+ if (tick_key_set_params)
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_KEY,
+ tick_hmac_key, sizeof(tick_hmac_key));
+ *p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
if (aes128cbc == NULL
|| !EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, aes128cbc, NULL, tick_aes_key, iv, enc)
- || !EVP_MAC_init(hctx, tick_hmac_key, sizeof(tick_hmac_key),
- params))
+ || !(tick_key_set_params
+ ? EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(hctx, params)
+ : EVP_MAC_init(hctx, tick_hmac_key, sizeof(tick_hmac_key),
+ params)))
ret = -1;
else
ret = tick_key_renew ? 2 : 1;
@@ -12656,6 +12663,10 @@ static int tick_key_evp_cb(SSL *s, unsigned char key_name[16],
* Test 17: TLSv1.3, ticket key callback, ticket, renewal
* Test 18: TLSv1.2, ticket key callback, no ticket
* Test 19: TLSv1.3, ticket key callback, no ticket
+ * Test 20: TLSv1.2, ticket key callback using set_params, ticket, no renewal
+ * Test 21: TLSv1.3, ticket key callback using set_params, ticket, no renewal
+ * Test 22: TLSv1.2, ticket key callback using set_params, ticket, renewal
+ * Test 23: TLSv1.3, ticket key callback using set_params, ticket, renewal
*/
static int test_ticket_callbacks(int tst)
{
@@ -12681,13 +12692,19 @@ static int test_ticket_callbacks(int tst)
/* Which tests the ticket key callback should request renewal for */
- if (tst == 10 || tst == 11 || tst == 16 || tst == 17)
+ if (tst == 10 || tst == 11 || tst == 16 || tst == 17 || tst >= 22)
tick_key_renew = 1;
else if (tst == 12 || tst == 13 || tst == 18 || tst == 19)
tick_key_renew = -1; /* abort sending the ticket/0-length ticket */
else
tick_key_renew = 0;
+ /*
+ * Tests 20 to 23 only supply the HMAC key and digest through
+ * EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(), without calling EVP_MAC_init()
+ */
+ tick_key_set_params = (tst >= 20);
+
/* Which tests the decrypt ticket callback should request renewal for */
switch (tst) {
case 0:
@@ -12902,6 +12919,7 @@ static int clienthello_cb_server_random(const SSL_METHOD *smeth,
tick_key_evp_cb_server_random)))
goto end;
tick_key_renew = 0;
+ tick_key_set_params = 0;
tick_key_cb_called = 0;
sni_cb_random_cnt = dec_tick_cb_random_cnt = tick_key_cb_random_cnt = 0;
@@ -20028,7 +20046,7 @@ int setup_tests(void)
#endif
ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_ssl_pending, 2);
ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_ssl_get_shared_ciphers, OSSL_NELEM(shared_ciphers_data));
- ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_ticket_callbacks, 20);
+ ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_ticket_callbacks, 24);
ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_tls_clienthello_cb_server_random, 2);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS
ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_dtls_clienthello_cb_server_random, 2);