Commit bd649f019f for qemu.org
commit bd649f019f4d12cea6a658a4878030e0c759cb0e
Author: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Date: Mon Nov 9 14:23:56 2026 +0900
hw/net/net_tx_pkt: Sanity check GSO headers in net_tx_pkt_build_vheader()
In net_tx_pkt_build_vheader(), we are insufficiently cautious
about headers from the packet from the guest. Add more checking:
* that the segment offload payload gso_size isn't 0
* that the packet is not too small
* that the TCP th_off is inside the payload
* that we aren't going to overflow in our header length calculation
Of these, the most significant extra check is in calculation of the
virt_hdr length. We calculate this with
pkt->virt_hdr.hdr_len = pkt->hdr_len + l4hdr.th_off * sizeof(uint32_t);
The struct field is 16 bits, and so this can overflow if the guest
hands us a packet of close to 64K in size and an appropriate
l4hdr.th_off. The effect is that we record a bogus virt_hdr.hdr_len,
and later on in net_tx_pkt_tcp_fragment_init() this will cause us
to make a very large allocation that causes g_malloc() to abort.
This is a hardening issue rather than a security issue, because the
amount of guest control over the allocation size is such that it can
only generate allocations very close to SIZE_MAX which always make
g_malloc() abort, and so it's a guest self-denial-of-service only.
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Fixes: e263cd49c73c595 ("Packet abstraction for VMWARE network devices")
Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/work_items/3648
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Akihiko Odaki <odaki@rsg.ci.i.u-tokyo.ac.jp>
Reviewed-by: Akihiko Odaki <odaki@rsg.ci.i.u-tokyo.ac.jp>
Message-id: 20261109-eth-v2-11-334cc08e2f2e@rsg.ci.i.u-tokyo.ac.jp
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
diff --git a/hw/net/net_tx_pkt.c b/hw/net/net_tx_pkt.c
index b134348fe8..b2935900fe 100644
--- a/hw/net/net_tx_pkt.c
+++ b/hw/net/net_tx_pkt.c
@@ -335,6 +335,11 @@ bool net_tx_pkt_build_vheader(struct NetTxPkt *pkt, bool tso_enable,
break;
case VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP:
+ if (IP_FRAG_ALIGN_SIZE(gso_size) == 0 ||
+ pkt->payload_len < sizeof(struct udp_header) ||
+ pkt->hdr_len + sizeof(struct udp_header) > UINT16_MAX) {
+ return false;
+ }
pkt->virt_hdr.gso_size = gso_size;
pkt->virt_hdr.hdr_len = pkt->hdr_len + sizeof(struct udp_header);
break;
@@ -344,7 +349,10 @@ bool net_tx_pkt_build_vheader(struct NetTxPkt *pkt, bool tso_enable,
bytes_read = iov_to_buf(&pkt->vec[NET_TX_PKT_PL_START_FRAG],
pkt->payload_frags, 0, &l4hdr, sizeof(l4hdr));
if (bytes_read < sizeof(l4hdr) ||
- l4hdr.th_off * sizeof(uint32_t) < sizeof(l4hdr)) {
+ gso_size == 0 ||
+ l4hdr.th_off * sizeof(uint32_t) < sizeof(l4hdr) ||
+ l4hdr.th_off * sizeof(uint32_t) > pkt->payload_len ||
+ pkt->hdr_len + l4hdr.th_off * sizeof(uint32_t) > UINT16_MAX) {
return false;
}