Commit d95e10195a for qemu.org

commit d95e10195acaf9281efc6db2db64a50a90b233ba
Author: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Date:   Mon Nov 9 14:23:57 2026 +0900

    hw/net/net_tx_pkt: Sanity check virt hdr len in net_tx_tcp_fragment_init

    In net_tx_pkt_tcp_fragment_init() we calculate the l4 header size by
    subtracting the packet's virt_hdr.hdr_len from its overall length,
    and then we g_malloc() that many bytes.  This shouldn't underflow if
    the caller has been sanity checking sizes and offsets, but as
    defence-in-depth, check again here before relying on it for the
    malloc size.

    This change would suffice to avoid the guest self-denial-of-service
    via overflowing the virt_hdr.hdr_len calculation in
    net_tx_pkt_tcp_fragment_init() which we fixed in the preceding
    commit.

    Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
    Fixes: 02ef5fdc092bd4 ("hw/net/net_tx_pkt: Implement TCP segmentation")
    Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/work_items/3648
    Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
    Signed-off-by: Akihiko Odaki <odaki@rsg.ci.i.u-tokyo.ac.jp>
    Reviewed-by: Akihiko Odaki <odaki@rsg.ci.i.u-tokyo.ac.jp>
    Message-id: 20261109-eth-v2-12-334cc08e2f2e@rsg.ci.i.u-tokyo.ac.jp
    Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>

diff --git a/hw/net/net_tx_pkt.c b/hw/net/net_tx_pkt.c
index b2935900fe..dc2563721e 100644
--- a/hw/net/net_tx_pkt.c
+++ b/hw/net/net_tx_pkt.c
@@ -604,7 +604,7 @@ static bool net_tx_pkt_tcp_fragment_init(struct NetTxPkt *pkt,
     size_t bytes_read = 0;
     struct tcp_hdr *th;

-    if (!pkt->payload_frags) {
+    if (!pkt->payload_frags || pkt->virt_hdr.hdr_len <= pkt->hdr_len) {
         return false;
     }