Commit e70df21848 for bind
commit e70df218488e10fee4902366363255c3cb98a1fb
Author: Michał Kępień <michal@isc.org>
Date: Thu Nov 19 18:11:24 2026 +0100
Pass server instances via test fixtures
The module kept the resolver's and the authoritative server's addresses
in constants, and ns2's static-stubs listed the server's address. The
tests now take the servers as their ns2 and ans1 fixtures, and ns2's
template names the server.
diff --git a/bin/tests/system/nsec_grandparent/ns2/named.conf.j2 b/bin/tests/system/nsec_grandparent/ns2/named.conf.j2
index edb74ad438..355c706524 100644
--- a/bin/tests/system/nsec_grandparent/ns2/named.conf.j2
+++ b/bin/tests/system/nsec_grandparent/ns2/named.conf.j2
@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@
// validating resolver
+{% set ans1 = Nameserver("ans1") %}
+
options {
{% include_indented "_common/options.conf.j2" %}
dnssec-validation yes;
@@ -19,7 +21,7 @@ options {
zone "p031.test" {
type static-stub;
- server-addresses { 10.53.0.1; };
+ server-addresses { @ans1.ip@; };
};
{% include "_common/trusted.conf.j2" %}
diff --git a/bin/tests/system/nsec_grandparent/tests_nsec_grandparent.py b/bin/tests/system/nsec_grandparent/tests_nsec_grandparent.py
index df3d3b482d..0a3cb3ea6e 100644
--- a/bin/tests/system/nsec_grandparent/tests_nsec_grandparent.py
+++ b/bin/tests/system/nsec_grandparent/tests_nsec_grandparent.py
@@ -9,8 +9,6 @@
# See the COPYRIGHT file distributed with this work for additional
# information regarding copyright ownership.
-from pathlib import Path
-
import dns.name
import dns.rdataclass
import dns.rdatatype
@@ -57,9 +55,6 @@ GENUINE_ALGORITHM = 13 # ECDSAP256SHA256, the parent key
DUMMY_ALGORITHM = 0 # keep in sync with ans1/ans.py
MAX_VALIDATIONS_PER_FETCH = 16 # keep in sync with ans1/ans.py
-AUTH = "10.53.0.1" # ans1, the attacker-controlled authoritative server
-RESOLVER = "10.53.0.2" # ns2, the validating resolver under test
-
REFUSED_NSEC_LOG = (
"is_insecure_referral: NSEC signer above known secure DS; "
"refusing insecure-delegation proof"
@@ -147,12 +142,11 @@ def _rrsig_signers(response, section, owner, covered):
return [(rdata.signer.to_text(), int(rdata.algorithm)) for rdata in rrsig]
-def _auth_query_count(qname, qtype):
+def _ans_query_count(server, qname, qtype):
"""
Number of times the mock auth server received qname/qtype.
"""
- log = Path("ans1/ans.run").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
- return log.count(f"Received {qname.rstrip('.')}/IN/{qtype} (ID=")
+ return len(server.log.grep(f"Received {qname.rstrip('.')}/IN/{qtype} (ID="))
def _check_no_downgrade(response, qname):
@@ -180,7 +174,7 @@ def _check_refusal_logged(server, qname, expected_log):
watcher.wait_for_line(f"validating {qname.rstrip('.')}/A: {expected_log}")
-def test_auth_serves_forged_grandparent_nsec():
+def test_auth_serves_forged_grandparent_nsec(ans1):
"""
Check the attacker's server, not the resolver.
@@ -193,7 +187,7 @@ def test_auth_serves_forged_grandparent_nsec():
ans1/ans.py ever stops serving that forgery, this fails here instead
of quietly turning every test_resolver_rejects_* below into a pass.
"""
- child_ds = isctest.query.tcp(isctest.query.create(CHILD, "DS"), AUTH)
+ child_ds = isctest.query.tcp(isctest.query.create(CHILD, "DS"), ans1.ip)
isctest.check.noerror(child_ds)
assert child_ds.get_rrset(
child_ds.answer, CHILD, dns.rdataclass.IN, dns.rdatatype.DS
@@ -202,7 +196,7 @@ def test_auth_serves_forged_grandparent_nsec():
(PARENT, GENUINE_ALGORITHM)
], child_ds.to_text()
- grandchild_ds = isctest.query.tcp(isctest.query.create(GRANDCHILD, "DS"), AUTH)
+ grandchild_ds = isctest.query.tcp(isctest.query.create(GRANDCHILD, "DS"), ans1.ip)
isctest.check.noerror(grandchild_ds)
nsec = grandchild_ds.get_rrset(
grandchild_ds.authority, GRANDCHILD, dns.rdataclass.IN, dns.rdatatype.NSEC
@@ -216,7 +210,7 @@ def test_auth_serves_forged_grandparent_nsec():
) == [(PARENT, GENUINE_ALGORITHM)], grandchild_ds.to_text()
-def test_resolver_rejects_grandparent_nsec_downgrade(servers):
+def test_resolver_rejects_grandparent_nsec_downgrade(ns2, ans1):
"""
Reproducer for #5967: an NSEC signed by the grandparent must not
downgrade a secure delegation to insecure. Here the forged proof
@@ -224,30 +218,30 @@ def test_resolver_rejects_grandparent_nsec_downgrade(servers):
fetch_callback_ds().
"""
_check_no_downgrade(
- isctest.query.tcp(isctest.query.create(ATTACK, "A"), RESOLVER), ATTACK
+ isctest.query.tcp(isctest.query.create(ATTACK, "A"), ns2.ip), ATTACK
)
- _check_refusal_logged(servers["ns2"], ATTACK, REFUSED_NSEC_LOG)
+ _check_refusal_logged(ns2, ATTACK, REFUSED_NSEC_LOG)
# The rejected proof must also stop the insecurity walk: without the
# early stop, the validator descends and asks the (attacker-controlled)
# server for a DS at the attack name.
- assert _auth_query_count(ATTACK, "DS") == 0
+ assert _ans_query_count(ans1, ATTACK, "DS") == 0
-def test_resolver_rejects_grandparent_nsec3_downgrade(servers):
+def test_resolver_rejects_grandparent_nsec3_downgrade(ns2, ans1):
"""
The same downgrade as above, with the forgery expressed as an NSEC3,
which reaches is_insecure_referral()'s trynsec3 arm instead.
"""
_check_no_downgrade(
- isctest.query.tcp(isctest.query.create(ATTACK3, "A"), RESOLVER), ATTACK3
+ isctest.query.tcp(isctest.query.create(ATTACK3, "A"), ns2.ip), ATTACK3
)
- _check_refusal_logged(servers["ns2"], ATTACK3, REFUSED_NSEC3_LOG)
+ _check_refusal_logged(ns2, ATTACK3, REFUSED_NSEC3_LOG)
- assert _auth_query_count(ATTACK3, "DS") == 0
+ assert _ans_query_count(ans1, ATTACK3, "DS") == 0
-def test_resolver_rejects_sibling_zone_nsec3(servers):
+def test_resolver_rejects_sibling_zone_nsec3(ns2):
"""
Reproducer for #6234 (sibling-zone NSEC3).
@@ -265,13 +259,13 @@ def test_resolver_rejects_sibling_zone_nsec3(servers):
Before the fix this fails: the resolver returns the forged answer.
"""
_check_no_downgrade(
- isctest.query.tcp(isctest.query.create(ATTACK3_SIBLING, "A"), RESOLVER),
+ isctest.query.tcp(isctest.query.create(ATTACK3_SIBLING, "A"), ns2.ip),
ATTACK3_SIBLING,
)
- _check_refusal_logged(servers["ns2"], ATTACK3_SIBLING, IGNORED_NSEC3_LOG)
+ _check_refusal_logged(ns2, ATTACK3_SIBLING, IGNORED_NSEC3_LOG)
-def test_auth_serves_mixed_signer_grandparent_nsec():
+def test_auth_serves_mixed_signer_grandparent_nsec(ans1):
"""
Premise check for the #6321 reproducers below, again against ans1
directly rather than the resolver.
@@ -294,7 +288,9 @@ def test_auth_serves_mixed_signer_grandparent_nsec():
[(PARENT, GENUINE_ALGORITHM), (GRANDCHILD_DUMMY_LAST, DUMMY_ALGORITHM)],
),
]:
- grandchild_ds = isctest.query.tcp(isctest.query.create(grandchild, "DS"), AUTH)
+ grandchild_ds = isctest.query.tcp(
+ isctest.query.create(grandchild, "DS"), ans1.ip
+ )
isctest.check.noerror(grandchild_ds)
nsec = grandchild_ds.get_rrset(
grandchild_ds.authority, grandchild, dns.rdataclass.IN, dns.rdatatype.NSEC
@@ -309,7 +305,7 @@ def test_auth_serves_mixed_signer_grandparent_nsec():
assert signers == expected, grandchild_ds.to_text()
-def test_resolver_rejects_mixed_signer_nsec_dummy_first(servers):
+def test_resolver_rejects_mixed_signer_nsec_dummy_first(ns2, ans1):
"""
Reproducer for #6321: the NSEC is still the grandparent's forgery from
test_resolver_rejects_grandparent_nsec_downgrade(), and it still
@@ -322,17 +318,17 @@ def test_resolver_rejects_mixed_signer_nsec_dummy_first(servers):
and the forged answer below the secure delegation is accepted.
"""
_check_no_downgrade(
- isctest.query.tcp(isctest.query.create(ATTACK_DUMMY_FIRST, "A"), RESOLVER),
+ isctest.query.tcp(isctest.query.create(ATTACK_DUMMY_FIRST, "A"), ns2.ip),
ATTACK_DUMMY_FIRST,
)
- _check_refusal_logged(servers["ns2"], ATTACK_DUMMY_FIRST, REFUSED_MIXED_LOG)
+ _check_refusal_logged(ns2, ATTACK_DUMMY_FIRST, REFUSED_MIXED_LOG)
# A mixed-signer set is forged outright, so the walk must stop there
# just like the plain grandparent forgery does.
- assert _auth_query_count(ATTACK_DUMMY_FIRST, "DS") == 0
+ assert _ans_query_count(ans1, ATTACK_DUMMY_FIRST, "DS") == 0
-def test_resolver_rejects_mixed_signer_nsec_dummy_last(servers):
+def test_resolver_rejects_mixed_signer_nsec_dummy_last(ns2, ans1):
"""
Control for the test above with the RRSIGs in the other order: the
genuine grandparent signature first, the dummy second. Whatever the
@@ -340,15 +336,15 @@ def test_resolver_rejects_mixed_signer_nsec_dummy_last(servers):
wire order the attacker chooses.
"""
_check_no_downgrade(
- isctest.query.tcp(isctest.query.create(ATTACK_DUMMY_LAST, "A"), RESOLVER),
+ isctest.query.tcp(isctest.query.create(ATTACK_DUMMY_LAST, "A"), ns2.ip),
ATTACK_DUMMY_LAST,
)
- _check_refusal_logged(servers["ns2"], ATTACK_DUMMY_LAST, REFUSED_MIXED_LOG)
+ _check_refusal_logged(ns2, ATTACK_DUMMY_LAST, REFUSED_MIXED_LOG)
- assert _auth_query_count(ATTACK_DUMMY_LAST, "DS") == 0
+ assert _ans_query_count(ans1, ATTACK_DUMMY_LAST, "DS") == 0
-def test_resolver_rejects_mixed_signer_nsec_from_cache(servers):
+def test_resolver_rejects_mixed_signer_nsec_from_cache(ns2, ans1):
"""
The dummy-first forgery again, with a second name below the same
grandchild so that whatever the first walk left in the cache (the
@@ -356,27 +352,25 @@ def test_resolver_rejects_mixed_signer_nsec_from_cache(servers):
resolver accepted it) is what the insecurity walk finds this time.
"""
_check_no_downgrade(
- isctest.query.tcp(isctest.query.create(ATTACK_DUMMY_FIRST, "A"), RESOLVER),
+ isctest.query.tcp(isctest.query.create(ATTACK_DUMMY_FIRST, "A"), ns2.ip),
ATTACK_DUMMY_FIRST,
)
- ds_fetches = _auth_query_count(GRANDCHILD_DUMMY_FIRST, "DS")
+ ds_fetches = _ans_query_count(ans1, GRANDCHILD_DUMMY_FIRST, "DS")
_check_no_downgrade(
- isctest.query.tcp(
- isctest.query.create(ATTACK_DUMMY_FIRST_CACHED, "A"), RESOLVER
- ),
+ isctest.query.tcp(isctest.query.create(ATTACK_DUMMY_FIRST_CACHED, "A"), ns2.ip),
ATTACK_DUMMY_FIRST_CACHED,
)
- _check_refusal_logged(servers["ns2"], ATTACK_DUMMY_FIRST_CACHED, REFUSED_MIXED_LOG)
+ _check_refusal_logged(ns2, ATTACK_DUMMY_FIRST_CACHED, REFUSED_MIXED_LOG)
# As in test_resolver_rejects_downgrade_from_cached_proof(): no new DS
# fetch for the grandchild proves the mixed proof came from the cache,
# none for the attack name proves the walk stopped there.
- assert _auth_query_count(GRANDCHILD_DUMMY_FIRST, "DS") == ds_fetches
- assert _auth_query_count(ATTACK_DUMMY_FIRST_CACHED, "DS") == 0
+ assert _ans_query_count(ans1, GRANDCHILD_DUMMY_FIRST, "DS") == ds_fetches
+ assert _ans_query_count(ans1, ATTACK_DUMMY_FIRST_CACHED, "DS") == 0
-def test_auth_serves_many_rrsig_grandparent_nsec():
+def test_auth_serves_many_rrsig_grandparent_nsec(ans1):
"""
Premise check for the RRSIG-count tests below, against ans1 directly.
@@ -388,7 +382,9 @@ def test_auth_serves_many_rrsig_grandparent_nsec():
(GRANDCHILD_TOO_MANY, MAX_VALIDATIONS_PER_FETCH),
(GRANDCHILD_ALMOST_TOO_MANY, MAX_VALIDATIONS_PER_FETCH - 1),
]:
- grandchild_ds = isctest.query.tcp(isctest.query.create(grandchild, "DS"), AUTH)
+ grandchild_ds = isctest.query.tcp(
+ isctest.query.create(grandchild, "DS"), ans1.ip
+ )
isctest.check.noerror(grandchild_ds)
assert grandchild_ds.get_rrset(
grandchild_ds.authority, grandchild, dns.rdataclass.IN, dns.rdatatype.NSEC
@@ -403,7 +399,7 @@ def test_auth_serves_many_rrsig_grandparent_nsec():
], grandchild_ds.to_text()
-def test_resolver_rejects_nsec_with_too_many_rrsigs(servers):
+def test_resolver_rejects_nsec_with_too_many_rrsigs(ns2, ans1):
"""
An NSEC proof carrying at least max-validations-per-fetch RRSIGs is
refused outright, before any signer is looked at. The signatures
@@ -412,15 +408,15 @@ def test_resolver_rejects_nsec_with_too_many_rrsigs(servers):
instead; the log line pins which rule fired.
"""
_check_no_downgrade(
- isctest.query.tcp(isctest.query.create(ATTACK_TOO_MANY, "A"), RESOLVER),
+ isctest.query.tcp(isctest.query.create(ATTACK_TOO_MANY, "A"), ns2.ip),
ATTACK_TOO_MANY,
)
- _check_refusal_logged(servers["ns2"], ATTACK_TOO_MANY, REFUSED_TOO_MANY_LOG)
+ _check_refusal_logged(ns2, ATTACK_TOO_MANY, REFUSED_TOO_MANY_LOG)
- assert _auth_query_count(ATTACK_TOO_MANY, "DS") == 0
+ assert _ans_query_count(ans1, ATTACK_TOO_MANY, "DS") == 0
-def test_resolver_bounds_nsec_just_below_rrsig_cap(servers):
+def test_resolver_bounds_nsec_just_below_rrsig_cap(ns2, ans1):
"""
Control for the test above with one RRSIG fewer: the cap must not
fire, the validator must still authenticate the NSEC through the
@@ -428,15 +424,15 @@ def test_resolver_bounds_nsec_just_below_rrsig_cap(servers):
be refused by the ordinary grandparent-signer bound.
"""
_check_no_downgrade(
- isctest.query.tcp(isctest.query.create(ATTACK_ALMOST_TOO_MANY, "A"), RESOLVER),
+ isctest.query.tcp(isctest.query.create(ATTACK_ALMOST_TOO_MANY, "A"), ns2.ip),
ATTACK_ALMOST_TOO_MANY,
)
- _check_refusal_logged(servers["ns2"], ATTACK_ALMOST_TOO_MANY, REFUSED_NSEC_LOG)
+ _check_refusal_logged(ns2, ATTACK_ALMOST_TOO_MANY, REFUSED_NSEC_LOG)
- assert _auth_query_count(ATTACK_ALMOST_TOO_MANY, "DS") == 0
+ assert _ans_query_count(ans1, ATTACK_ALMOST_TOO_MANY, "DS") == 0
-def test_resolver_rejects_downgrade_from_cached_proof(servers):
+def test_resolver_rejects_downgrade_from_cached_proof(ns2, ans1):
"""
The same downgrade as above, with the forged proof already in the
cache when the insecurity walk reaches it, so the refusal runs in
@@ -445,18 +441,16 @@ def test_resolver_rejects_downgrade_from_cached_proof(servers):
# Prime the cache: walking the insecurity proof for ATTACK fetches the
# forged NODATA proof for GRANDCHILD/DS, which is validated and cached
# independently of the failed A validation.
- isctest.check.servfail(
- isctest.query.tcp(isctest.query.create(ATTACK, "A"), RESOLVER)
- )
+ isctest.check.servfail(isctest.query.tcp(isctest.query.create(ATTACK, "A"), ns2.ip))
- ds_fetches = _auth_query_count(GRANDCHILD, "DS")
+ ds_fetches = _ans_query_count(ans1, GRANDCHILD, "DS")
_check_no_downgrade(
- isctest.query.tcp(isctest.query.create(ATTACK_CACHED, "A"), RESOLVER),
+ isctest.query.tcp(isctest.query.create(ATTACK_CACHED, "A"), ns2.ip),
ATTACK_CACHED,
)
- _check_refusal_logged(servers["ns2"], ATTACK_CACHED, REFUSED_NSEC_LOG)
+ _check_refusal_logged(ns2, ATTACK_CACHED, REFUSED_NSEC_LOG)
# No new DS fetch for GRANDCHILD confirms the proof really did come from
# the cache; none for ATTACK_CACHED confirms the walk stopped there.
- assert _auth_query_count(GRANDCHILD, "DS") == ds_fetches
- assert _auth_query_count(ATTACK_CACHED, "DS") == 0
+ assert _ans_query_count(ans1, GRANDCHILD, "DS") == ds_fetches
+ assert _ans_query_count(ans1, ATTACK_CACHED, "DS") == 0