Commit 31e62c2ebbfd for kernel
commit 31e62c2ebbfdc3fe3dbdf5e02c92a9dc67087a3a
Author: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Date: Wed May 13 11:37:18 2026 -0700
ptrace: slightly saner 'get_dumpable()' logic
The 'dumpability' of a task is fundamentally about the memory image of
the task - the concept comes from whether it can core dump or not - and
makes no sense when you don't have an associated mm.
And almost all users do in fact use it only for the case where the task
has a mm pointer.
But we have one odd special case: ptrace_may_access() uses 'dumpable' to
check various other things entirely independently of the MM (typically
explicitly using flags like PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS). Including for
threads that no longer have a VM (and maybe never did, like most kernel
threads).
It's not what this flag was designed for, but it is what it is.
The ptrace code does check that the uid/gid matches, so you do have to
be uid-0 to see kernel thread details, but this means that the
traditional "drop capabilities" model doesn't make any difference for
this all.
Make it all make a *bit* more sense by saying that if you don't have a
MM pointer, we'll use a cached "last dumpability" flag if the thread
ever had a MM (it will be zero for kernel threads since it is never
set), and require a proper CAP_SYS_PTRACE capability to override.
Reported-by: Qualys Security Advisory <qsa@qualys.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
diff --git a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h
index 368c7b4d7cb5..ee06cba5c6f5 100644
--- a/include/linux/sched.h
+++ b/include/linux/sched.h
@@ -1002,6 +1002,9 @@ struct task_struct {
unsigned sched_rt_mutex:1;
#endif
+ /* Save user-dumpable when mm goes away */
+ unsigned user_dumpable:1;
+
/* Bit to tell TOMOYO we're in execve(): */
unsigned in_execve:1;
unsigned in_iowait:1;
diff --git a/kernel/exit.c b/kernel/exit.c
index 9a909993ab1d..f50d73c272d6 100644
--- a/kernel/exit.c
+++ b/kernel/exit.c
@@ -571,6 +571,7 @@ static void exit_mm(void)
*/
smp_mb__after_spinlock();
local_irq_disable();
+ current->user_dumpable = (get_dumpable(mm) == SUID_DUMP_USER);
current->mm = NULL;
membarrier_update_current_mm(NULL);
enter_lazy_tlb(mm, current);
diff --git a/kernel/ptrace.c b/kernel/ptrace.c
index 68c17daef8d4..130043bfc209 100644
--- a/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -272,11 +272,24 @@ static bool ptrace_has_cap(struct user_namespace *ns, unsigned int mode)
return ns_capable(ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE);
}
+static bool task_still_dumpable(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
+{
+ struct mm_struct *mm = task->mm;
+ if (mm) {
+ if (get_dumpable(mm) == SUID_DUMP_USER)
+ return true;
+ return ptrace_has_cap(mm->user_ns, mode);
+ }
+
+ if (task->user_dumpable)
+ return true;
+ return ptrace_has_cap(&init_user_ns, mode);
+}
+
/* Returns 0 on success, -errno on denial. */
static int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred(), *tcred;
- struct mm_struct *mm;
kuid_t caller_uid;
kgid_t caller_gid;
@@ -337,11 +350,8 @@ static int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
* Pairs with a write barrier in commit_creds().
*/
smp_rmb();
- mm = task->mm;
- if (mm &&
- ((get_dumpable(mm) != SUID_DUMP_USER) &&
- !ptrace_has_cap(mm->user_ns, mode)))
- return -EPERM;
+ if (!task_still_dumpable(task, mode))
+ return -EPERM;
return security_ptrace_access_check(task, mode);
}