Commit 9e2dcd506b for openssl.org

commit 9e2dcd506b2a23e970d3ad20785b28b94500cbe5
Author: Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@openssl.org>
Date:   Mon Aug 24 07:20:12 2026 +0200

    CHANGES.md, NEWS.md: reorder HollowByte change log record, add missing period

    Move HollowByte change log record after records with assigned CVE
    numbers and severity ratings, add period at the end of the lead
    sentence, add a link to the PR in the comment.

    Complements: c4c5d2bbd7ab "Update CHANGES/NEWS to mention the HollowByte fix"
    Signed-off-by: Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@openssl.org>
    Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.foundation>
    Reviewed-by: Andrew Dinh <andrewd@openssl.org>
    Merge-date: Fri Aug 28 11:16:08 2026
    Merged-from: https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/32484

diff --git a/CHANGES.md b/CHANGES.md
index 36b16e367b..4ed318db2a 100644
--- a/CHANGES.md
+++ b/CHANGES.md
@@ -431,20 +431,6 @@ OpenSSL 4.0

 ### Changes between 4.0.0 and 4.0.1 [9 Jun 2026]

- * Fixed excessive allocation of the handshake message buffer (aka HollowByte)
-
-   Previously, we would allocate a buffer large enough to hold the full size of
-   an incoming handshake message as advertised by the peer. This could be quite
-   large (although it is bounded, e.g. for ClientHello this is approximately
-   128 KiB). If the peer then fails to send the full handshake message, then the
-   endpoint is left waiting for the remainder of the message to arrive and the
-   memory is still allocated (i.e. a Slowloris attack). To prevent this, we
-   incrementally grow the buffer as we receive the data.
-
-   This issue was reported by Okta Red Team.
-
-   *Matt Caswell*
-
  * Fixed heap use-after-free in `PKCS7_verify()`.

    Severity: High
@@ -777,6 +763,21 @@ OpenSSL 4.0

    *Dmitry Belyavskiy (Red Hat)*

+ * Fixed excessive allocation of the handshake message buffer (aka HollowByte).
+
+   Previously, we would allocate a buffer large enough to hold the full size of
+   an incoming handshake message as advertised by the peer. This could be quite
+   large (although it is bounded, e.g. for ClientHello this is approximately
+   128 KiB). If the peer then fails to send the full handshake message, then the
+   endpoint is left waiting for the remainder of the message to arrive and the
+   memory is still allocated (i.e. a Slowloris attack). To prevent this, we
+   incrementally grow the buffer as we receive the data.
+
+   This issue was reported by Okta Red Team.
+   <!-- https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/30792 -->
+
+   *Matt Caswell*
+
  * Fixed a regression introduced in 4.0.0 that led to a `openssl pkey`
    command crash when it was invoked to encrypt a private key with password
    being provided interactively.
diff --git a/NEWS.md b/NEWS.md
index 3a86c0767e..eef56c879f 100644
--- a/NEWS.md
+++ b/NEWS.md
@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ This release incorporates the following bug fixes and mitigations:
     and AES-SIV modes.
     ([CVE-2026-45446])

-  * Fixed excessive allocation of the handshake message buffer (aka HollowByte)
+  * Fixed excessive allocation of the handshake message buffer (aka HollowByte).

   * Fixed a regression introduced in 4.0.0 that led to a `openssl pkey`
     command crash when it was invoked to encrypt a private key with password