Commit b7d69bad17 for openssl.org
commit b7d69bad17e54111174b981788ab2a17854cca5c
Author: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Date: Thu Dec 11 15:58:53 2025 +0000
Delete the RSA EVP_PKEY_METHOD
It is no longer used so can be removed
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Yang <paulyang.inf@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/29384)
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/build.info b/crypto/rsa/build.info
index ad3370db39..bf5316883e 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/build.info
+++ b/crypto/rsa/build.info
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ $COMMON=rsa_ossl.c rsa_gen.c rsa_lib.c rsa_sign.c rsa_pk1.c \
SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=$COMMON\
rsa_saos.c rsa_err.c rsa_asn1.c rsa_ameth.c rsa_prn.c \
- rsa_pmeth.c rsa_meth.c rsa_mp.c
+ rsa_meth.c rsa_mp.c
IF[{- !$disabled{'deprecated-0.9.8'} -}]
SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=rsa_depr.c
ENDIF
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c
deleted file mode 100644
index dfc9537b3a..0000000000
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,935 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright 2006-2025 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
- *
- * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
- * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
- * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
- * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
- */
-
-/*
- * RSA low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for
- * internal use.
- */
-#include "internal/deprecated.h"
-
-#include "internal/constant_time.h"
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
-#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
-#include <openssl/x509.h>
-#include <openssl/rsa.h>
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
-#include <openssl/cms.h>
-#include "crypto/evp.h"
-#include "crypto/rsa.h"
-#include "rsa_local.h"
-
-/* RSA pkey context structure */
-
-typedef struct {
- /* Key gen parameters */
- int nbits;
- BIGNUM *pub_exp;
- int primes;
- /* Keygen callback info */
- int gentmp[2];
- /* RSA padding mode */
- int pad_mode;
- /* message digest */
- const EVP_MD *md;
- /* message digest for MGF1 */
- const EVP_MD *mgf1md;
- /* PSS salt length */
- int saltlen;
- /* Minimum salt length or -1 if no PSS parameter restriction */
- int min_saltlen;
- /* Temp buffer */
- unsigned char *tbuf;
- /* OAEP label */
- unsigned char *oaep_label;
- size_t oaep_labellen;
- /* if to use implicit rejection in PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption */
- int implicit_rejection;
-} RSA_PKEY_CTX;
-
-/* True if PSS parameters are restricted */
-#define rsa_pss_restricted(rctx) (rctx->min_saltlen != -1)
-
-static int pkey_rsa_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
-{
- RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*rctx));
-
- if (rctx == NULL)
- return 0;
- rctx->nbits = 2048;
- rctx->primes = RSA_DEFAULT_PRIME_NUM;
- if (pkey_ctx_is_pss(ctx))
- rctx->pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING;
- else
- rctx->pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
- /* Maximum for sign, auto for verify */
- rctx->saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO;
- rctx->min_saltlen = -1;
- rctx->implicit_rejection = 1;
- ctx->data = rctx;
- ctx->keygen_info = rctx->gentmp;
- ctx->keygen_info_count = 2;
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int pkey_rsa_copy(EVP_PKEY_CTX *dst, const EVP_PKEY_CTX *src)
-{
- RSA_PKEY_CTX *dctx, *sctx;
-
- if (!pkey_rsa_init(dst))
- return 0;
- sctx = src->data;
- dctx = dst->data;
- dctx->nbits = sctx->nbits;
- if (sctx->pub_exp) {
- dctx->pub_exp = BN_dup(sctx->pub_exp);
- if (!dctx->pub_exp)
- return 0;
- }
- dctx->pad_mode = sctx->pad_mode;
- dctx->md = sctx->md;
- dctx->mgf1md = sctx->mgf1md;
- dctx->saltlen = sctx->saltlen;
- dctx->implicit_rejection = sctx->implicit_rejection;
- if (sctx->oaep_label) {
- OPENSSL_free(dctx->oaep_label);
- dctx->oaep_label = OPENSSL_memdup(sctx->oaep_label, sctx->oaep_labellen);
- if (!dctx->oaep_label)
- return 0;
- dctx->oaep_labellen = sctx->oaep_labellen;
- }
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int setup_tbuf(RSA_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX *pk)
-{
- if (ctx->tbuf != NULL)
- return 1;
- if ((ctx->tbuf = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pk->pkey)))) == NULL)
- return 0;
- return 1;
-}
-
-static void pkey_rsa_cleanup(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
-{
- RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
- if (rctx) {
- BN_free(rctx->pub_exp);
- OPENSSL_free(rctx->tbuf);
- OPENSSL_free(rctx->oaep_label);
- OPENSSL_free(rctx);
- }
-}
-
-static int pkey_rsa_sign(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig,
- size_t *siglen, const unsigned char *tbs,
- size_t tbslen)
-{
- int ret;
- RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
- /*
- * Discard const. Its marked as const because this may be a cached copy of
- * the "real" key. These calls don't make any modifications that need to
- * be reflected back in the "original" key.
- */
- RSA *rsa = (RSA *)EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(ctx->pkey);
- int md_size;
-
- if (rctx->md) {
- md_size = EVP_MD_get_size(rctx->md);
- if (md_size <= 0) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH);
- return -1;
- }
-
- if (tbslen != (size_t)md_size) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH);
- return -1;
- }
-
- if (EVP_MD_get_type(rctx->md) == NID_mdc2) {
- unsigned int sltmp;
- if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)
- return -1;
- ret = RSA_sign_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(0, tbs, (int)tbslen, sig, &sltmp, rsa);
-
- if (ret <= 0)
- return ret;
- ret = sltmp;
- } else if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_X931_PADDING) {
- if ((size_t)RSA_size(rsa) < tbslen + 1) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
- return -1;
- }
- if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx)) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
- return -1;
- }
- memcpy(rctx->tbuf, tbs, tbslen);
- rctx->tbuf[tbslen] = RSA_X931_hash_id(EVP_MD_get_type(rctx->md));
- ret = RSA_private_encrypt((int)(tbslen + 1), rctx->tbuf,
- sig, rsa, RSA_X931_PADDING);
- } else if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) {
- unsigned int sltmp;
- ret = RSA_sign(EVP_MD_get_type(rctx->md),
- tbs, (unsigned int)tbslen, sig, &sltmp, rsa);
- if (ret <= 0)
- return ret;
- ret = sltmp;
- } else if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
- if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx))
- return -1;
- if (!RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(rsa,
- rctx->tbuf, tbs,
- rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md,
- rctx->saltlen))
- return -1;
- ret = RSA_private_encrypt(RSA_size(rsa), rctx->tbuf,
- sig, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
- } else {
- return -1;
- }
- } else {
- ret = RSA_private_encrypt((int)tbslen, tbs, sig, rsa, rctx->pad_mode);
- }
- if (ret < 0)
- return ret;
- *siglen = ret;
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int pkey_rsa_verifyrecover(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
- unsigned char *rout, size_t *routlen,
- const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen)
-{
- int ret;
- RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
- /*
- * Discard const. Its marked as const because this may be a cached copy of
- * the "real" key. These calls don't make any modifications that need to
- * be reflected back in the "original" key.
- */
- RSA *rsa = (RSA *)EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(ctx->pkey);
-
- if (rctx->md) {
- if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_X931_PADDING) {
- if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx))
- return -1;
- ret = RSA_public_decrypt((int)siglen, sig, rctx->tbuf, rsa,
- RSA_X931_PADDING);
- if (ret <= 0)
- return 0;
- ret--;
- if (rctx->tbuf[ret] != RSA_X931_hash_id(EVP_MD_get_type(rctx->md))) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH);
- return 0;
- }
- if (ret != EVP_MD_get_size(rctx->md)) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH);
- return 0;
- }
- if (rout)
- memcpy(rout, rctx->tbuf, ret);
- } else if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) {
- size_t sltmp;
- ret = ossl_rsa_verify(EVP_MD_get_type(rctx->md),
- NULL, 0, rout, &sltmp,
- sig, siglen, rsa);
- if (ret <= 0)
- return 0;
- ret = (int)sltmp;
- } else {
- return -1;
- }
- } else {
- ret = RSA_public_decrypt((int)siglen, sig, rout, rsa, rctx->pad_mode);
- }
- if (ret <= 0)
- return ret;
- *routlen = ret;
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int pkey_rsa_verify(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
- const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen,
- const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen)
-{
- RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
- /*
- * Discard const. Its marked as const because this may be a cached copy of
- * the "real" key. These calls don't make any modifications that need to
- * be reflected back in the "original" key.
- */
- RSA *rsa = (RSA *)EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(ctx->pkey);
- size_t rslen;
- int md_size;
-
- if (rctx->md) {
- if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)
- return RSA_verify(EVP_MD_get_type(rctx->md), tbs, (unsigned int)tbslen,
- sig, (unsigned int)siglen, rsa);
- md_size = EVP_MD_get_size(rctx->md);
- if (md_size <= 0) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH);
- return -1;
- }
- if (tbslen != (size_t)md_size) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH);
- return -1;
- }
- if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_X931_PADDING) {
- if (pkey_rsa_verifyrecover(ctx, NULL, &rslen, sig, siglen) <= 0)
- return 0;
- } else if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
- int ret;
- if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx))
- return -1;
- ret = RSA_public_decrypt((int)siglen, sig, rctx->tbuf,
- rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
- if (ret <= 0)
- return 0;
- ret = RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(rsa, tbs,
- rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md,
- rctx->tbuf, rctx->saltlen);
- if (ret <= 0)
- return 0;
- return 1;
- } else {
- return -1;
- }
- } else {
- if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx))
- return -1;
- rslen = RSA_public_decrypt((int)siglen, sig, rctx->tbuf,
- rsa, rctx->pad_mode);
- if (rslen <= 0)
- return 0;
- }
-
- if ((rslen != tbslen) || memcmp(tbs, rctx->tbuf, rslen))
- return 0;
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int pkey_rsa_encrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
- unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen,
- const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen)
-{
- int ret;
- RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
- /*
- * Discard const. Its marked as const because this may be a cached copy of
- * the "real" key. These calls don't make any modifications that need to
- * be reflected back in the "original" key.
- */
- RSA *rsa = (RSA *)EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(ctx->pkey);
-
- if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) {
- int klen = RSA_size(rsa);
- if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx))
- return -1;
- if (!RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(rctx->tbuf, klen,
- in, (int)inlen,
- rctx->oaep_label,
- (int)rctx->oaep_labellen,
- rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md))
- return -1;
- ret = RSA_public_encrypt(klen, rctx->tbuf, out, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
- } else {
- ret = RSA_public_encrypt((int)inlen, in, out, rsa, rctx->pad_mode);
- }
- if (ret < 0)
- return ret;
- *outlen = ret;
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int pkey_rsa_decrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
- unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen,
- const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen)
-{
- int ret;
- int pad_mode;
- RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
- /*
- * Discard const. Its marked as const because this may be a cached copy of
- * the "real" key. These calls don't make any modifications that need to
- * be reflected back in the "original" key.
- */
- RSA *rsa = (RSA *)EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(ctx->pkey);
-
- if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) {
- if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx))
- return -1;
- ret = RSA_private_decrypt((int)inlen, in, rctx->tbuf, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
- if (ret <= 0)
- return ret;
- ret = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(out, ret, rctx->tbuf,
- ret, ret,
- rctx->oaep_label,
- (int)rctx->oaep_labellen,
- rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md);
- } else {
- if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING && rctx->implicit_rejection == 0)
- pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_NO_IMPLICIT_REJECT_PADDING;
- else
- pad_mode = rctx->pad_mode;
- ret = RSA_private_decrypt((int)inlen, in, out, rsa, pad_mode);
- }
- *outlen = constant_time_select_s(constant_time_msb_s(ret), *outlen, ret);
- ret = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_msb(ret), ret, 1);
- return ret;
-}
-
-static int check_padding_md(const EVP_MD *md, int padding)
-{
- int mdnid;
-
- if (!md)
- return 1;
-
- mdnid = EVP_MD_get_type(md);
-
- if (padding == RSA_NO_PADDING) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) {
- if (RSA_X931_hash_id(mdnid) == -1) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_X931_DIGEST);
- return 0;
- }
- } else {
- switch (mdnid) {
- /* List of all supported RSA digests */
- case NID_sha1:
- case NID_sha224:
- case NID_sha256:
- case NID_sha384:
- case NID_sha512:
- case NID_sha512_224:
- case NID_sha512_256:
- case NID_md5:
- case NID_md5_sha1:
- case NID_md2:
- case NID_md4:
- case NID_mdc2:
- case NID_ripemd160:
- case NID_sha3_224:
- case NID_sha3_256:
- case NID_sha3_384:
- case NID_sha3_512:
- return 1;
-
- default:
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST);
- return 0;
- }
- }
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int pkey_rsa_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, void *p2)
-{
- RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
- int md_size;
-
- switch (type) {
- case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PADDING:
- if ((p1 >= RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) && (p1 <= RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING)) {
- if (!check_padding_md(rctx->md, p1))
- return 0;
- if (p1 == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
- if (!(ctx->operation & (EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN | EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY)))
- goto bad_pad;
- if (!rctx->md)
- rctx->md = EVP_sha1();
- } else if (pkey_ctx_is_pss(ctx)) {
- goto bad_pad;
- }
- if (p1 == RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) {
- if (!(ctx->operation & EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT))
- goto bad_pad;
- if (!rctx->md)
- rctx->md = EVP_sha1();
- }
- rctx->pad_mode = p1;
- return 1;
- }
- bad_pad:
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE);
- return -2;
-
- case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PADDING:
- *(int *)p2 = rctx->pad_mode;
- return 1;
-
- case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN:
- case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN:
- if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN);
- return -2;
- }
- if (type == EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN) {
- *(int *)p2 = rctx->saltlen;
- } else {
- if (p1 < RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX)
- return -2;
- if (rsa_pss_restricted(rctx)) {
- if (p1 == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO
- && ctx->operation == EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN);
- return -2;
- }
- md_size = EVP_MD_get_size(rctx->md);
- if (md_size <= 0) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH);
- return -2;
- }
- if ((p1 == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST
- && rctx->min_saltlen > md_size)
- || (p1 >= 0 && p1 < rctx->min_saltlen)) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL);
- return 0;
- }
- }
- rctx->saltlen = p1;
- }
- return 1;
-
- case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_BITS:
- if (p1 < RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
- return -2;
- }
- rctx->nbits = p1;
- return 1;
-
- case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_PUBEXP:
- if (p2 == NULL || !BN_is_odd((BIGNUM *)p2) || BN_is_one((BIGNUM *)p2)) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
- return -2;
- }
- BN_free(rctx->pub_exp);
- rctx->pub_exp = p2;
- return 1;
-
- case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_PRIMES:
- if (p1 < RSA_DEFAULT_PRIME_NUM || p1 > RSA_MAX_PRIME_NUM) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_KEY_PRIME_NUM_INVALID);
- return -2;
- }
- rctx->primes = p1;
- return 1;
-
- case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_MD:
- case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_MD:
- if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE);
- return -2;
- }
- if (type == EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_MD)
- *(const EVP_MD **)p2 = rctx->md;
- else
- rctx->md = p2;
- return 1;
-
- case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_MD:
- if (!check_padding_md(p2, rctx->pad_mode))
- return 0;
- if (rsa_pss_restricted(rctx)) {
- if (EVP_MD_get_type(rctx->md) == EVP_MD_get_type(p2))
- return 1;
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED);
- return 0;
- }
- rctx->md = p2;
- return 1;
-
- case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_MD:
- *(const EVP_MD **)p2 = rctx->md;
- return 1;
-
- case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_MGF1_MD:
- case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_MGF1_MD:
- if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING
- && rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_MGF1_MD);
- return -2;
- }
- if (type == EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_MGF1_MD) {
- if (rctx->mgf1md)
- *(const EVP_MD **)p2 = rctx->mgf1md;
- else
- *(const EVP_MD **)p2 = rctx->md;
- } else {
- if (rsa_pss_restricted(rctx)) {
- if (EVP_MD_get_type(rctx->mgf1md) == EVP_MD_get_type(p2))
- return 1;
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_MGF1_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED);
- return 0;
- }
- rctx->mgf1md = p2;
- }
- return 1;
-
- case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_LABEL:
- if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE);
- return -2;
- }
- OPENSSL_free(rctx->oaep_label);
- if (p2 && p1 > 0) {
- rctx->oaep_label = p2;
- rctx->oaep_labellen = p1;
- } else {
- rctx->oaep_label = NULL;
- rctx->oaep_labellen = 0;
- }
- return 1;
-
- case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_LABEL:
- if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE);
- return -2;
- }
- if (p2 == NULL) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
- return 0;
- }
- *(unsigned char **)p2 = rctx->oaep_label;
- return (int)rctx->oaep_labellen;
-
- case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_IMPLICIT_REJECTION:
- if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE);
- return -2;
- }
- rctx->implicit_rejection = p1;
- return 1;
-
- case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DIGESTINIT:
- case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_SIGN:
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
- case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_SIGN:
-#endif
- return 1;
-
- case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_ENCRYPT:
- case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_DECRYPT:
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
- case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_DECRYPT:
- case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_ENCRYPT:
-#endif
- if (!pkey_ctx_is_pss(ctx))
- return 1;
- /* fall through */
- case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY:
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE);
- return -2;
-
- default:
- return -2;
- }
-}
-
-static int pkey_rsa_ctrl_str(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
- const char *type, const char *value)
-{
- if (value == NULL) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_VALUE_MISSING);
- return 0;
- }
- if (strcmp(type, "rsa_padding_mode") == 0) {
- int pm;
-
- if (strcmp(value, "pkcs1") == 0) {
- pm = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
- } else if (strcmp(value, "none") == 0) {
- pm = RSA_NO_PADDING;
- } else if (strcmp(value, "oeap") == 0) {
- pm = RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING;
- } else if (strcmp(value, "oaep") == 0) {
- pm = RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING;
- } else if (strcmp(value, "x931") == 0) {
- pm = RSA_X931_PADDING;
- } else if (strcmp(value, "pss") == 0) {
- pm = RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING;
- } else {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
- return -2;
- }
- return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx, pm);
- }
-
- if (strcmp(type, "rsa_pss_saltlen") == 0) {
- int saltlen;
-
- if (!strcmp(value, "digest"))
- saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST;
- else if (!strcmp(value, "max"))
- saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX;
- else if (!strcmp(value, "auto"))
- saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO;
- else
- saltlen = atoi(value);
- return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(ctx, saltlen);
- }
-
- if (strcmp(type, "rsa_keygen_bits") == 0) {
- int nbits = atoi(value);
-
- return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_bits(ctx, nbits);
- }
-
- if (strcmp(type, "rsa_keygen_pubexp") == 0) {
- int ret;
-
- BIGNUM *pubexp = NULL;
- if (!BN_asc2bn(&pubexp, value))
- return 0;
- ret = EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_rsa_keygen_pubexp(ctx, pubexp);
- BN_free(pubexp);
- return ret;
- }
-
- if (strcmp(type, "rsa_keygen_primes") == 0) {
- int nprimes = atoi(value);
-
- return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_primes(ctx, nprimes);
- }
-
- if (strcmp(type, "rsa_mgf1_md") == 0)
- return EVP_PKEY_CTX_md(ctx,
- EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG | EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT,
- EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_MGF1_MD, value);
-
- if (pkey_ctx_is_pss(ctx)) {
-
- if (strcmp(type, "rsa_pss_keygen_mgf1_md") == 0)
- return EVP_PKEY_CTX_md(ctx, EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN,
- EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_MGF1_MD, value);
-
- if (strcmp(type, "rsa_pss_keygen_md") == 0)
- return EVP_PKEY_CTX_md(ctx, EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN,
- EVP_PKEY_CTRL_MD, value);
-
- if (strcmp(type, "rsa_pss_keygen_saltlen") == 0) {
- int saltlen = atoi(value);
-
- return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_keygen_saltlen(ctx, saltlen);
- }
- }
-
- if (strcmp(type, "rsa_oaep_md") == 0)
- return EVP_PKEY_CTX_md(ctx, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT,
- EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_MD, value);
-
- if (strcmp(type, "rsa_oaep_label") == 0) {
- unsigned char *lab;
- long lablen;
- int ret;
-
- lab = OPENSSL_hexstr2buf(value, &lablen);
- if (!lab)
- return 0;
- ret = EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_rsa_oaep_label(ctx, lab, lablen);
- if (ret <= 0)
- OPENSSL_free(lab);
- return ret;
- }
-
- return -2;
-}
-
-/* Set PSS parameters when generating a key, if necessary */
-static int rsa_set_pss_param(RSA *rsa, EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
-{
- RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
-
- if (!pkey_ctx_is_pss(ctx))
- return 1;
- /* If all parameters are default values don't set pss */
- if (rctx->md == NULL && rctx->mgf1md == NULL && rctx->saltlen == -2)
- return 1;
- rsa->pss = ossl_rsa_pss_params_create(rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md,
- rctx->saltlen == -2
- ? 0
- : rctx->saltlen);
- if (rsa->pss == NULL)
- return 0;
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int pkey_rsa_keygen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
-{
- RSA *rsa = NULL;
- RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
- BN_GENCB *pcb;
- int ret;
-
- if (rctx->pub_exp == NULL) {
- rctx->pub_exp = BN_new();
- if (rctx->pub_exp == NULL || !BN_set_word(rctx->pub_exp, RSA_F4))
- return 0;
- }
- rsa = RSA_new();
- if (rsa == NULL)
- return 0;
- if (ctx->pkey_gencb) {
- pcb = BN_GENCB_new();
- if (pcb == NULL) {
- RSA_free(rsa);
- return 0;
- }
- evp_pkey_set_cb_translate(pcb, ctx);
- } else {
- pcb = NULL;
- }
- ret = RSA_generate_multi_prime_key(rsa, rctx->nbits, rctx->primes,
- rctx->pub_exp, pcb);
- BN_GENCB_free(pcb);
- if (ret > 0 && !rsa_set_pss_param(rsa, ctx)) {
- RSA_free(rsa);
- return 0;
- }
- if (ret > 0)
- EVP_PKEY_assign(pkey, ctx->pmeth->pkey_id, rsa);
- else
- RSA_free(rsa);
- return ret;
-}
-
-static const EVP_PKEY_METHOD rsa_pkey_meth = {
- EVP_PKEY_RSA,
- EVP_PKEY_FLAG_AUTOARGLEN,
- pkey_rsa_init,
- pkey_rsa_copy,
- pkey_rsa_cleanup,
-
- 0, 0,
-
- 0,
- pkey_rsa_keygen,
-
- 0,
- pkey_rsa_sign,
-
- 0,
- pkey_rsa_verify,
-
- 0,
- pkey_rsa_verifyrecover,
-
- 0, 0, 0, 0,
-
- 0,
- pkey_rsa_encrypt,
-
- 0,
- pkey_rsa_decrypt,
-
- 0, 0,
-
- pkey_rsa_ctrl,
- pkey_rsa_ctrl_str
-};
-
-const EVP_PKEY_METHOD *ossl_rsa_pkey_method(void)
-{
- return &rsa_pkey_meth;
-}
-
-/*
- * Called for PSS sign or verify initialisation: checks PSS parameter
- * sanity and sets any restrictions on key usage.
- */
-
-static int pkey_pss_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
-{
- const RSA *rsa;
- RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
- const EVP_MD *md;
- const EVP_MD *mgf1md;
- int min_saltlen, max_saltlen, md_size;
-
- /* Should never happen */
- if (!pkey_ctx_is_pss(ctx))
- return 0;
- rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(ctx->pkey);
- /* If no restrictions just return */
- if (rsa->pss == NULL)
- return 1;
- /* Get and check parameters */
- if (!ossl_rsa_pss_get_param(rsa->pss, &md, &mgf1md, &min_saltlen))
- return 0;
-
- /* See if minimum salt length exceeds maximum possible */
- md_size = EVP_MD_get_size(md);
- if (md_size <= 0) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH);
- return 0;
- }
- max_saltlen = RSA_size(rsa) - md_size;
- if ((RSA_bits(rsa) & 0x7) == 1)
- max_saltlen--;
- if (min_saltlen > max_saltlen) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_SALT_LENGTH);
- return 0;
- }
-
- rctx->min_saltlen = min_saltlen;
-
- /*
- * Set PSS restrictions as defaults: we can then block any attempt to
- * use invalid values in pkey_rsa_ctrl
- */
-
- rctx->md = md;
- rctx->mgf1md = mgf1md;
- rctx->saltlen = min_saltlen;
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-static const EVP_PKEY_METHOD rsa_pss_pkey_meth = {
- EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS,
- EVP_PKEY_FLAG_AUTOARGLEN,
- pkey_rsa_init,
- pkey_rsa_copy,
- pkey_rsa_cleanup,
-
- 0, 0,
-
- 0,
- pkey_rsa_keygen,
-
- pkey_pss_init,
- pkey_rsa_sign,
-
- pkey_pss_init,
- pkey_rsa_verify,
-
- 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
-
- pkey_rsa_ctrl,
- pkey_rsa_ctrl_str
-};
-
-const EVP_PKEY_METHOD *ossl_rsa_pss_pkey_method(void)
-{
- return &rsa_pss_pkey_meth;
-}